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Surveys are sometimes viewed with suspicion when used to provide economic
values, since they have been proved to be sensitive to framing eﬀects. However,
the extent to which those eﬀects may vary between individuals has received little
attention. Are some individuals less sensitive to framing eﬀects than others ?
How to detect them ? These are the questions addressed in this paper. We use
the theory of social representation to assign to each individual a new variable
that is proved to be a proxy for the individual’s sensitivity to framing eﬀects.
We examine two framing eﬀects which are known to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
valuation, namely, starting-point bias and willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
accept divergence. It is proved that the representation variable allows researchers
to gather new and relevant information to limit the impact of framing eﬀects.
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21 Introduction
It has long been recognized that the design of a survey may inﬂuence respondents’
answers. In the particular case in which respondents have to estimate numerical values,
this implies that two diﬀerent surveys may lead to two diﬀerent valuations of the same
object. Such a variation of answers, induced by non-signiﬁcant change in the survey
design, is called a framing eﬀect. Consequently, surveys are sometimes viewed with
suspicion when used to provide economic values, since framing eﬀects may alter the
quality of survey-based valuation. The existence of these eﬀects is well documented
(Levin et al. 1998). However, the extent to which they may vary between individuals
has received little attention. Are some individuals less sensitive to framing eﬀects than
others ? How to detect them ? These are the questions addressed in this paper.
Our basic idea is to use the theory of social representation to assign to each individual
a new variable. This variable represents a proxy for the individual’s sensitivity to framing
eﬀects. According to this representation variable, we isolate two types of individuals.
The ﬁrst type is proved to be less sensitive to framing eﬀects than the other. We
examine two framing eﬀects which are known to have a dramatic eﬀect on valuation,
namely, starting-point bias and willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept
(WTA) divergence. The results suggest that taking into account heterogenous sensitivity
to framing eﬀects is successful in limiting the impact of biases. Furthermore, they
prove that the constructed representation variable is not correlated to any of the usual
variables. Thus, using the representation variable allows researchers to gather relevant
new information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details how social representation can
be used to design a new individual variable. Section 3 presents study of the problem
of starting-point bias in contingent valuation surveys. Section 4 deals with WTA and
WTP divergence. Section 5 provides a discussion, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Representation as a source of heterogeneity
Representations are deﬁned in a broad sense by social psychologists as a form of knowl-
edge that serves as a basis for perceiving and interpreting reality, as well as for guiding
one’s behavior. Representation could concern a speciﬁc object, or a more general notion
of social interest1. The founding work (Moscovici 1961) explores the representation of
1A survey of the theory and methods used to study social representations can be found in Wagner
et al. (1999) and Canter and Breakwell (1993)
3psychoanalysis. In the following decades, various topics have been investigated: repre-
sentation of diﬀerent cities, madness, remarkable places, hunting, AIDS, among others
(see the diﬀerent articles presented in Farr and Moscovici 1984 and Moscovici 1998).
The theory of representation has proved useful in the study of economic subjects such
as saving and debt (Viaud and Roland-Levy 2000), or the electronic purse (Penz et al.
2004).
The basic structure of a social representation is composed of a central core and of
peripheral elements (Abric 1993). The central core contains the most obvious elements
commonly associated with the object. They can be viewed as stereotypes or common
sense. Those elements are not subject to any dispute, as everyone agrees that they are
related to the object described. The core in itself does not contain much information
and usually is not a surprise to an observer. The peripheral elements, however, contain
fewer consensual elements and are less obvious. They represent potential changes in the
social representation and indicate new elements that may in the near future become part
of the core. They are, somehow, rivals of the core elements.
There are several ways to explore the composition of social representations of partic-
ular subjects (namely, ethnography, interviews, focus-groups, the content analysis of the
media, questionnaires and experiments). In what follows, we will focus on a particular
technique, which is the statistical analysis of word associations. These word associations
are gathered through answers to an open-ended question such as ”What are the words
that come to mind when thinking of [the object]?” or ”What does [the object] evoke to
you?”. Thus, the purpose of such questions is to investigate the words being sponta-
neously associated with a given object. The next step is thus to determine the core of
the social representation, on the basis of those individual answers. Once the core has
been found, we sort individuals according to those who refer to the core of the social
representation and those who don’t. This ”aller-retour” between social and individual
representations can be compared to an election system where individual opinions are
aggregated, using majority voting. Once individuals have voted, it is possible to recog-
nize who belongs to the majority and who doesn’t. All in all, the task is to transform
representations (i.e. lists of words) into a quantitative and individual variable.
The method consists of four steps, each of which is illustrated with an example,
namely the Camargue representation2. The Camargue is a major wetland in the delta of
the Rhˆ one (south of France) covering 75.000 hectares. Of exceptional biological diversity,
it hosts many fragile ecosystems and is inhabited by numerous species. The survey was
administered to 218 visitors to the Camargue at the end of their visit3. Note that the
2This method was originally developed in Flachaire et al. (2003)
3See Claeys-Mekdade et al. (1999) for a complete description of the survey
4respondents had therefore spent some time in the Camargue.
Step 1: The data: collecting lists of words
The usual way to collect information on representation is by open-ended questions.
More precisely, we use a question such as: ”What does [the object] evoke to you?” or
”What are the words that come to mind when thinking of [the object]?”. Individuals
are expected to provide a list of words or expressions. Thus, the data take the form of
ordered lists of words. The set of answers typically displays a large number of diﬀerent
words, as each individual provides diﬀerent answers. Indeed, a great variety of words
can be used to describe a given object (Verg` es 1994, Wagner et al. 1999).
Application: In our questionnaire, respondents were asked: ”What words come to
your mind when you think about the Camargue?” More than 300 diﬀerent words or
expressions have been obtained.
Step 2: Classiﬁcation: choosing a typology for words
An individual representation is captured through an ordered list of words. The high
number of diﬀerent words (say 100 to 500) imposes a categorization, i.e. putting together
words that are ”close” enough. Choosing a particular categorization thus consists in
deﬁning a particular typology for the set of words. Empirical applications typically use
six to ten categories, which are chosen so as to form homogeneous categories. This step
is the only one which leaves the researcher with some degree of freedom, since the notion
of proximity is not straightforward.
After categorization, each individual’s answer is transformed into an ordered list of
categories (rather than a list of words). At the end of this categorization, we are left with
individual representations containing doubles, that is, with several attributes belonging
to the same category. To obtain transitive individual representations, we suppress the
lower-ranking citations belonging to the same category. Such treatment eliminates some
information. In our case, the length of individual answers decreased by 20%.
After treatment (i.e. categorization + suppression of doubles), individual represen-
tations boil down to an individual ranking of the set of categories.
Application: A basic categorization by frame of reference leads to eight diﬀerent cat-
egories. For instance, the ﬁrst category is called Fauna and Flora. It contains all the
attributes which refer to the animals and local vegetation of the Camargue (fauna, 62
5citations, birds, 44, ﬂora, 44, bulls, 37, horses, 53, ﬂamingos, 36, ...). The other cat-
egories are Landscape, Disorientation, Isolation, Preservation, Human presence and Coast.
A particular case is the category Nature which only contains the word nature which can
hardly fall into any of the previous categories. There is a ninth category which clusters
all attributes which do not refer to any of the categories mentioned above4.
Step 3: Finding the core
The simplest way of determining the core element is to classify the diﬀerent categories
according to their citation rate. The core is thus composed of the category that is most
widely used by individuals. This is in accordance with the deﬁnition of the core as the
most consensual and widely accepted elements associated with a given object.
Application: After consolidating the data in step 2, we were left with 218 ordered lists
of categories. We computed the number of appearances for each category. The results
are presented in Table 1. The top element, Fauna-Flora, is used by a large number of









Table 1: Citation Rank
respondents, 82%. Only a minority do not use any element of this category. This is
not a big surprise since the main interest of the Camargue (as presented in all related
commercial publications, or represented on postcards) is the Fauna and Flora category5.
4After categorization and deletion of doubles, the average number of attributes evoked by the re-
spondents falls from 5.5 to 4.0.
5A quick look at any website about the Camargue is also a way of conﬁrming Fauna-Flora as the ob-
vious aspect of the Camargue. Among many others see: www.parc-camargue.fr or www.camargue.com
6Step 4: Sorting individuals
We choose to isolate individuals who do not mention the top element of the social
representation (i.e. the core of the social representation). This leads to a breakdown of
individuals into two sub-samples: one which contains the individuals who used the core
element in their representation, and one which contains the individuals who did not.
The main reason for this is that it is remarkable not to mention any of the core
elements. It is thus assumed that not mentioning the core is indeed signiﬁcant. Since it
does not conform to most common practice, this group is often referred to as “minority”.
The other group, which mentions the core element, is referred to as “mainstream”.
Application: In the case of the Camargue, the subjects were interviewed at the end of
their visit and had seen a lot of animals and plants (they could even see some of them
while being interviewed). A small minority of individuals did not refer to Fauna and
Flora (18% of the total population, see Table 1).
Given these four steps, we are left with two categories of individuals. This leads to a
breakdown of individuals into two sub-samples: those who refer to the core of the social
representation (mainstream) and the others (minority). We can deﬁne a mainstream
dummy variable, which can be used to control the sensitivity to framing eﬀects. To
do so, existing models have to be adapted. In the following, we use this new variable
with empirical data, considering two standard framing eﬀects, starting point bias and
WTA-WTP divergence.
3 Starting-point bias
In contingent valuation, respondents are asked if they are willing to pay a ﬁxed sum
of money for a given policy to be implemented. This discrete choice format is recom-
mended by the NOAA panel over other methods (a panel of experts that sets guidelines
to run evaluation surveys, see Arrow et al. 1993). This ”take it or leave it” format
mimics a market situation which individuals face in everyday market transactions, and
it is incentive-compatible. However, a major drawback is that it leads to a qualita-
tive dependent variable (the respondent answers yes or no), which reveals little about
the individual’s willingness-to-pay (WTP). To gather more information on respondents’
WTP, Hanemann (1985) and Carson (1985) proposed adding a follow-up discrete choice
question to improve the eﬃciency of discrete choice questionnaires. This mechanism is
known as the double bounded model. It basically consists of proposing a second bid to
the respondent, greater than the ﬁrst bid, if the respondent’s ﬁrst answer is yes, and
7lower otherwise.
Several studies have found that estimates of the mean of willingness-to-pay are sub-
stantially diﬀerent from estimates based on the ﬁrst question alone. This is the so-called
starting-point bias (Herriges and Shogren 1996), which can be seen as a particular case
of the anchoring bias put forward by Tversky and Kahneman (1974)6. Diﬀerent models
have been proposed in the litterature to control for such undesirable eﬀects. However,
empirical results suggest that eﬃciency gains obtained with follow-up questions are lost
relative to models using ﬁrst questions only. All these models assume that all individuals
are equally sensitive to starting-point bias. In this section, we consider that some indi-
viduals may be more sensitive than others to starting-point bias. We develop a model
to handle starting-point bias with heterogeneity in two groups. An application shows
that, with individual sensitivity to starting-point bias, we can control for starting-point
bias with eﬃciency gains.
3.1 Model
Diﬀerent models are proposed in the literature to control for starting-point bias in
double-bounded models. All these models assume that the second answer is sensitive
to the ﬁrst bid oﬀer, in the sense that a prior willingness-to-pay Wi is used by the re-
spondent i to respond to the ﬁrst bid oﬀer, b1i, and an updated willingness-to-pay W ′
i is
used to respond to the second bid, b2i. Each model leads to a speciﬁc deﬁnition of W ′
i.
Whitehead (2002) proposes a general model, combining several eﬀects, as follows:
W
′
i = Wi + γ (b1i − Wi) + δ, (1)
where γ and δ are two parameters. If δ = 0 this model corresponds to the Anchoring
model proposed by Herriges and Shogren (1996), where the respondents combine their
prior WTP with the value provided by the ﬁrst bid, such that the ﬁrst bid oﬀer plays
the role of an anchor. The parameter γ measures the strength of the anchoring eﬀect
(0 ≤ γ ≤ 1). If γ = 0 this model corresponds to the Shift model proposed by Alberini
et al. (1997), where the WTP systematically shifts between the two answers. The ﬁrst
bid oﬀer is thus interpreted as providing information about the cost or the quality of the
object: a respondent can interpret a higher bid oﬀer as paying more for the same object
6The anchoring bias appears in experimental settings in which subjects are asked to provide numerical
estimations (e.g. the height of Mount Everest). Prior to the estimation stage, they are asked to compare
their value to an externally provided value (e.g. 20 000 feet). This last value received the name of anchor
as it was proved to have a great inﬂuence on subjects’ valuations (i.e. a diﬀerent anchor, or starting
point, leads to a diﬀerent valuation)
8and a lower bid oﬀer as paying less for a lower quality object. The model (1) combines
both Anchoring and Shift eﬀects.
In model (1), all individuals are supposed to be sensitive to the ﬁrst bid oﬀer in the
same manner: the two parameters γ and δ are constant across individuals. If only some
respondents are inﬂuenced by the ﬁrst bid (i.e. they combine their prior WTP with the
ﬁrst bid), while the others do not, individual heterogeneity is present. It is well known
that econometric estimation of regression models can be seriously misleading if such
heterogeneity is not taken into account. Let us assume that we can divide respondents
into two distinct groups: one group subject to starting-point bias and another insensitive.







Wi if Ii = 0
Wi + γ (b1i − Wi) + δ if Ii = 1
(2)
where Ii is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when individual i belongs to one group
and 0 if he belongs to the other group. Note that, if Ii = 1 for all respondents, this
model reduces to the Anchoring & Shift model ; if Ii = 0 for all respondents, it reduces
to the standard Double-bounded model.
These models can be estimated with random eﬀect probit models, taking into account
the dynamic aspect of follow-up questions (Cameron and Quiggin 1994, Alberini et al.
1997, Whitehead 2004). Estimation requires simulated methods and a formal deﬁnition
of the probability that the individual i answers yes to the jth question, j = 1,2. For the
heterogenous model (2), we calculate this probability, which is equal to:





bji + θ(b1i − bji)IiDj + λIiDj
 
(3)
where D1 = 0 and D2 = 1, α = β/σ, θ = γ/(σ−γσ) and λ = δ/(σ−γσ). Based on this
equation, the parameters are interrelated according to:
β = ασ, γ = θσ/(1 + θσ) and δ = λσ(1 − γ). (4)
Implementation of the Double-bounded model is obtained with δ = γ = 0, which corre-
sponds to θ = λ = 0 in (3). Implementation of the Anchoring & Shift model is obtained
with Ii = 1 for i = 1,...,n. For a more detailed discussion on the estimation of a
random eﬀect probit model, see Alberini et al. (1997), and Whitehead (2004).
93.2 Results
We use the dummy variable mainstream, deﬁned in the previous section, and the Ca-
margue survey to conduct an application. In practice, a value of particular interest is
the estimate of the WTP mean. Once a model has been estimated, we can obtain ﬁtted
values ˆ Wi, for i = 1,...,n, from which we can calculate the estimate of the mean of
WTP: ˆ µ = n−1  n
i=1 ˆ Wi. We estimate the mean values of WTP from a linear model
(MacFadden and Leonard 1993) and compute the conﬁdence intervals by simulation with
the Krinsky and Robb procedure (see Haab and McConnell 2003, ch.4). Table 2 presents
estimates of the WTP mean, obtained from the Double-bounded, Anchoring & Shift and
Heterogeneous models. We include estimates obtained from the Single-bounded, taking
into account the ﬁrst answers only. The analysis is based on two criteria: if the mean of
WTP is consistent (consistency) and if the standard errors are more precise (eﬃciency)
with those obtained from the Single-bounded model.
Model WTP mean conf. interval consistency eﬃciency
Single-bounded 113.5 [98.1;138.2]
Double-bounded 89.8 [84.4;96.5] no yes
Anchoring & Shift 158.5 [122.6;210.7] yes no
Heterogeneous 110.1 [99.0;125.2] yes yes
Table 2: Estimation of the mean of willingness-to-pay
The Single-bounded and Double-bounded models give very diﬀerent WTP means:
113.5 and 89.8. Their conﬁdence intervals do not overlap. Such inconsistent results sug-
gest that follow-up questions generate starting-point bias in the Double-bounded model.
To control for starting-point bias, we estimate an Anchoring & Shift model. The
WTP mean is equal to 158.5. It is still very diﬀerent from the WTP mean obtained
from the Single-bounded model (113.5); however, the two conﬁdence intervals overlap
slightly. Note that the conﬁdence interval is very wide and the gain in precision obtained
by using follow-up questions is lost, a result suggested by Herriges and Shogren (1996).
The Heterogeneous model gives a WTP mean of 110.1. It is very close to the 113.5
obtained from the Single-bounded model. Moreover, the conﬁdence interval obtained
from the Heterogeneous model ([99.0;125.2]), is entirely contained in the conﬁdence
interval obtained from the Single-bounded model ([98.1;138.2]), and thus is narrower. In
other words, the Heterogeneous model provides consistent results with the Single-bounded
model, and is more precise.
10Variables Single Double Anch & Shift Heterogeneous
α1: Constant 0.77 .993 1.11 .665 0.80 .676 1.13 .677
α2: Distance home-site 0.20 .073 0.08 .037 0.07 .038 0.07 .038
α3: Using a car to arrive -1.35 .658 -0.89 .334 -0.94 .335 -0.96 .339
α4: Employee 2.11 .667 1.11 .382 1.02 .382 1.12 .386
α5: Middle class 2.42 .638 1.22 .361 1.23 .363 1.28 .369
α6: Inactive 1.15 .667 0.83 .416 0.71 .418 0.81 .419
α7: Working class 2.14 .924 1.02 .523 1.01 .528 1.09 .534
α8: White collar 1.77 .514 0.99 .318 0.97 .318 1.03 .323
α9: Visiting with family 0.10 .501 0.18 .338 0.12 .336 0.16 .341
α10: Visiting alone 1.34 1.01 1.41 .639 1.40 .641 1.45 .652
α11: Visiting with a group 0.98 .733 -0.12 .422 0.04 .423 0.06 .426
α12: First visit 1.13 .458 0.18 .212 0.23 .214 0.27 .219
α13: New facilities proposed 1.25 .393 0.67 .201 0.66 .201 0.69 .203
α14: Other ﬁnancing proposed -0.70 .337 -0.35 .193 -0.33 .194 -0.34 .195
α15: South-West -0.53 .558 -0.54 .387 -0.51 .390 -0.50 .390
α16: South-East 0.92 .721 0.62 .428 0.56 .430 0.63 .431
α17: Questionnaire type -0.62 .314 -0.22 .184 -0.20 .186 -0.22 .187
α18: Investigator 1 0.51 .716 0.11 .435 0.08 .439 0.14 .437
α19: Investigator 2 -0.37 .769 -0.45 .475 -0.42 .479 -0.45 .478
σ 45.3 17.9 52.6 10.0 100.8 53.5 64.7 17.5
γ - - 0.46 0.29 0.26 0.22
δ - - -17.1 13.9 -9.9 7.7
ρ - 0.71 0.73 0.77
Table 3: Random eﬀects probit models (standard errors in italics)
Table 3 presents the full econometric results, that is, all the parameter estimates,
with the standard errors given in italics. It is clear from this table that using follow-up
questions (Double-bounded, Anchoring & Shift and Heterogenous models) provides sig-
niﬁcantly reduced standard errors, compared to using ﬁrst answers only (Single-bounded
model). Moreover, the precision of the parameter estimates of the regressors is quite
similar for the diﬀerent models using follow-up questions. The anchoring parameter γ
is statistically signiﬁcant when we perform a likelihood-ratio (LR) test of the null hy-
pothesis γ = 0, not the shift parameter δ. It suggests that, when the minority group
is not sensitive to starting-point bias (γ = 0, see equation 2), the mainstream group is
signiﬁcantly subject to such an eﬀect (ˆ γ = 0.26, with 0 ≤ ˆ γ ≤ 1).
Finally, the Heterogeneous model performs better than the others: it provides con-
sistent results with the Single-bounded model and greatly improves the precision of the
estimation. This suggests that taking into acount an individual sensitivity to starting-
point bias does indeed matter.
114 WTA and WTP divergence
Over the past twenty years, a large pattern of empirical evidence has accumulated sug-
gesting a signiﬁcant divergence between willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures of value,
where individuals have to pay for a given object or policy, and willingness-to-accept
(WTA) measures of value, where individuals sell the same object or receive money
to compensate for the suppression of the same policy (Brookshire and Coursey 1987).
Economic theory suggests that, with small income eﬀects, WTP and WTA should be
equivalent. Results from a meta-analysis however prove that the divergence, measured
by the ratio WTA/WTP, is often high (i.e. the ratio largely exceeds one) (Sayman and
¨ Onc¨ uler 2005). Since valuation measures are used for the study of many public-policy
questions, these results raise questions about which procedure to use in practice.
The divergence is frequent but can be controlled for. The existence of substitutes has
been proved to play an important role (Shogren et al. 1994). In the case of private goods
the divergence disappears if subjects are recruited among experienced dealers (List 2003,
2004). This suggests that individuals may learn to avoid the divergence. This intuition
is conﬁrmed by the design of an experimental protocol that eliminates the divergence
(Plott and Zeiler 2005). The basic ingredients of this protocol are the existence of
training rounds and the use of incentive-compatible mechanisms. Taken together, the
previous results suggest that subjects may learn to overcome the divergence within a
short period of time. These results, however, apply to private goods. If we consider the
valuation of some public policy, the time between the survey and the implementation of
the policy is too long to implement training rounds. This is the reason why being able
to detect subjects who are prone to framing eﬀects is of particular interest for contingent
valuations.
4.1 Survey
To measure the discrepancy between WTA and WTP for public goods, we needed to ﬁnd
a public good that can be sold or withdrawn, or bought or provided. Such public goods
are not the most common ones. However, we were lucky enough to be oﬀered a golden
opportunity. The University of Marne la Vall´ ee (France) was considering changing its
Saturday morning classes policy. The growing number of students led to an increasing
number of classes on Saturday morning due to the lack of available classrooms. Students
started to protest and asked for a clariﬁcation of the policy regarding classes on Saturday
morning. Two options were considered. Some students were told they would pay lower
fees if they accepted classes scheduled on Saturday. The reason for this was that the
12university could then rent the extra classroom during the week to movie companies to
use for ﬁlming on location. Other students were oﬀered the option of avoiding Saturday
classes by paying higher fees, as the university would have to rent an extra building.
So, the trade-oﬀ was between paying more to avoid Saturday classes and being paid
to attend them. Note that, even though the survey concerned students, it was used
to take a real decision. Thus, answers to this particular survey had an impact on the
respondents’ welfare.
We conducted a contingent valuation survey to evaluate both the willingness to pay to
avoid classes on Saturday and the willingness to accept classes on Saturday morning. The
survey was given to 359 students at the University of Marne La Vall´ ee: 184 individuals
were given the WTP version, 175 the WTA one (subjects were randomly assigned to
one version).
4.2 Heterogeneity
Gathering information on social representations using an additional open-ended question
leads to our four-step methodology. We propose here to simplify this treatment by
running this methodology on a sample of subjects, at a pre-test stage, to identify the
items that capture most of the opposition between mainstream and minority. This
allows us to detect mainstream and minority using a simple discrete choice question.
This greatly simpliﬁed the exploitation of the data. While the use of an open-ended
question implies a speciﬁc treatment (categorization and so on), the use of a simple
question does away with the need for any treatment.
Prior to the survey, we then elicited the representations “of classes on Saturday
morning”. Quite surprisingly, the survey revealed two groups that diﬀer more broadly
on their vision of university rather than on their vision of Saturday morning (we were
expecting more precise reasons, such as the opportunity to have a job on Saturday
morning, religious reasons). For the mainstream, the main goal of their studies is to
get diplomas, while the minority consider that the most important thing to get from
university is skills. Following our method, we then decided to include in the contingent
valuation survey an additional question labeled as follows:
In your opinion, the main purpose of your studies is to get:
1. diplomas 2. skills
The two items were presented in a random order. As expected, a large majority of 71%
of the 359 respondents, chose the ﬁrst option (diplomas). And only a minority chose the
13second option (skills). We now propose to explore the impact of this distinction on the
WTA-WTP divergence.
4.3 Results
Table 4 shows the WTP and WTA means for all the students (384, 175 for the WTA
version and 184 for the WTP version) and for the two sub-groups (those who answer
Diplomas and those who answer Skills). The last line presents the WTA/WTP ratio.
All Diplomas Skills
WTA 68.7 71.9 62.5
WTP 15.3 12.5 23.3
Ratio 4.5 5.8 2.7
Table 4: WTA/WTP divergence
If we neglect the distinction among respondents, the WTA and WTP means are very
diﬀerent, respectively equal to 68.7 and 15.3. The WTA/WTP ratio largely exceeds
one and is equal to 4.5. Then, we calculate the WTA and WTP means for individuals
who answered the question - diplomas and skills - separately. When we consider the
mainstream group (Diplomas), the discrepancy between WTA and WTP is wide and
the ratio higher (5.8). However, when we consider the minority group (Skills), the
discrepancy and the ratio (2.7) are signiﬁcantly reduced. Students from the minority
group are less sensitive to the WTA and WTP divergence. Even if the discrepancy is not
completely removed, the mainstream variable allows us to separate the whole population
into two groups that highly diﬀer in their sensibility to framing eﬀects, since the ratio
is falling from 5.8 for the mainstream group to 2.7 for the minority.
5 Further results and discussion
The previous results show that it is possible to extract information on individual rep-
resentation for a given object, which can be successfully used as a good proxy for the
individual sensibility to framing eﬀects. Evidence was presented for two distinct sets
of data and two diﬀerent well-known framing eﬀects. So far, we have basically found a
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the mainstream variable and the sensitivity
to framing eﬀects. The remaining question is thus why does this occur? The ﬁrst section
proves that the representation variable conveys new information, which is not related
14to other individual characteristics. The second section proposes an interpretation of
the link between social representation and framing eﬀects. General considerations on
social representation are given in a third section. The last section deals with possible
improvements to the proposed approach.
5.1 Does representation provide new information ?
Here, we check if the dummy variable, based on social representation, is correlated with
some other individual characteristics.
Variables Correlation
Distance from home-site 0.06 (0.38)
Using a car to arrive 0.09 (0.18)
Employee 0.01 (0.86)
Middle class 0.02 (0.76)
Inactive 0.05 (0.42)
Working class 0.08 (0.22)
White collar 0.06 (0.35)
Visiting with family 0.07 (0.27)
Visiting alone 0.06 (0.36)
Visiting with a group 0.01 (0.84)
Visiting the site for the ﬁrst time 0.12 (0.08)
New facilities proposed 0.01 (0.82)
Other ﬁnancing proposed 0.05 (0.42)
South-West 0.08 (0.24)
South-East 0.02 (0.77)
Questionnaire type 0.07 (0.32)
Investigator 1 0.00 (0.93)
Investigator 2 0.01 (0.85)
Table 5: The Camargue survey: correlation coeﬃcient.
First consider the Camargue survey. Table 5 shows the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient
ρ between the mainstream dummy variable and the regressors included in the regression
model. A P-value is given in parenthesis for the null hypothesis ρ = 0. We can see that
in all cases, the null is rejected (all the P-values are greater than 0.05). It suggests that
the dummy variable is not correlated to the regressors.
Secondly, consider the Saturday classes survey. Table 6 shows the Pearson correlation
coeﬃcient ρ between the Diplomas/Skills dummy variable and other questions from the
questionnaire. A P-value is given in parenthesis for the null hypothesis ρ = 0. We can
see that in all cases, the null is rejected (all the P-values are greater than 0.05). Again,
it suggests that the dummy variable is not correlated to the regressors.
15Variables Correlation
grant holder 0.01 (0.93)
Saturday job -0.05 (0.29)
Birth year 0.08 (0.14)
Sex 0.05 (0.31)
Feeling of achievement -0.03 (0.56)
Education (mother) -0.02 (0.77)
Education (father) -0.11 (0.08)
Education (self) -0.10 (0.05)
Opinion on the decision process 0.00 (0.99)
Table 6: Saturday classes survey: correlation coeﬃcient.
These results suggest that the information obtained from individual representation
cannot be captured by the use of standard individual characteristics. In this sense, it is
new information, not related to standard questions in surveys.
5.2 From representation to framing eﬀects
So far, we have concentrated on the most technical aspects, based on statistical evidence.
Here, we propose an interpretation about why representations can be linked to framing
eﬀects. This interpretation relies on three distinct arguments. The ﬁrst two are nothing
more than an application of general ideas developed in psychology and sociology. The
key argument is thus the third one.
1. Our use of social representation is very classical on some points and more original
on others. Identifying the core and peripheral elements of a social representation on the
basis of a statistical analysis of word associations is a classic in social psychology. It is
also admitted that peripheral elements are identiﬁed by a minority. Our approach thus
consists in pooling all minorities in one group.
2. The next step of our reasoning is to assume that these individuals are conscious
of not being members of the mainstream, while others may just follow the crowd with
no clear consciousness of doing so. The idea that members of the minority have a
more accurate perception of their identity is generally accepted in sociology. Thus, we
associate a classical sociological argument with a more psychological one.
3. The core idea of our work is that the minority group on a particular subject has
a stronger opinion, i.e. a more personal or elaborate point of view7. Thus, the minority
7Note that we do not exclude that some individuals may have a strong point of view which is in
accordance with that of the mainstream. We only suggest that we can isolate some individuals holding
16is more likely to resist outside inﬂuences and is therefore less sensitive to framing eﬀects.
5.3 Representation as a marker of past experience
If you have never coped with an object or a situation in the past in the past, you are
very likely to handle it at ﬁrst glance in a very predictable way, using common sense
or stereotypes. This is what the core represents. But, if for any reason, you have been
confronted with this problem in the past, it is very likely that you start recomposing
your representation of this object or situation (you don’t have the same representation of
Paris once you’ve been there). According to that view, non-mainstream representations
are then a consequence of past experiences. Representations can thus be thought of as
a fast and frugal way to capture information about past experiences.
If we now concentrate on the problem of eliciting preferences (say for public decision
making), representations allow us to isolate individuals that have somehow ”invested” in
their own preference. We expect them to hold a stronger opinion and have more stable
preferences, thus be less sensitive to framing eﬀects.
Such a distinction is similar to the debate on the origin of individual preferences
(Slovic 1991). Members of the minority are assumed to be individuals that have set
their preferences, while some members of the mainstream population are assumed to
construct their preferences through the elicitation process. Our results suggest how to
identify individuals that have set their preferences before the elicitation process begins.
The existence of such a population is not a surprise since in any experiments that intend
to detect biases, a small, but signiﬁcant, part of the subjects do not exhibit pathological
preferences (among many references, see the experiments in Kahneman and Tversky
2000). This paper is a ﬁrst step towards detecting such individuals.
5.4 Criticism, improvements and further research
The proposed method has reached the goal of proving that a substantial heterogeneity
relative to the sensitivity to framing eﬀects exists, even in socially very homogenous
populations such as students. The agenda for further research includes the design of
more subtle tools to classify individuals. Here, we are able to isolate a population that
is prove to be much less sensitive to framing eﬀects than the residual population. One
can think of a more continuous variable that measures the sensitivity to framing eﬀects.
a strong point of view.
17The proposed methodology is open to criticism at two distinct levels. As we are
exploiting an open-ended question, a choice has to be made on how to categorize the
answers. A good classiﬁcation requires the creation of homogeneous categories. Even
though our classiﬁcation8 tends to demonstrate the presence of individual sensitivity to
framing eﬀects, another choice could be considered. A second criticism may concern the
way we construct the two subpopulations on the basis of the social representation. Our
choice is to put respondents who cite the most cited category in a mainstream group,
and the others in the minority group. Other choices and alternatives splits (with more
than two groups) could be used. Finally, our dichotomous split has done a good job as
a ﬁrst step, but further research may help us to better understand the determinants of
individual sensitivity to framing eﬀects.
6 Conclusion
This paper is a ﬁrst step towards approaching heterogeneity relative to the sensitivity
to framing eﬀects. A simple tool is designed to detect a group of individuals that is
proved to be far less sensitive to framing eﬀects than the reference population. This
approach is eﬀective on two distinct sets of data concerning diﬀerent framing eﬀects.
This raises important questions at the normative level. How should values be set within
heterogeneous groups ? Should the values be computed using only the values of those
detected as not sensitive to framing eﬀects ?
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